Modem chemical control of pests has contributed to a dramatic improvement in public welfare since its introduction 50 years ago. Millions of lives have been saved through the control of disease vectors, and millions more have been improved by the use of chemicals to produce an inexpensive and abundant food supply. Hundreds of pesticidally active ingredients are in commercial use today, and among these are found genotoxic and nongenotoxic carcinogens. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency regulates carcinogens using threshold and nonthreshold approaches depending upon the outcome of a weight-of-evidence determination. More than one-half of all pesticides with some evidence of carcinogenic potential are regulated by the nonthreshold approach. The limitations on product use imposed by this approach have restricted the number of products available to growers and to the public. This restriction has had a direct impact on industry with respect to commercial success and financial returns on investment as well as an indirect impact on the industry's ability to fund the discovery and development of new compounds. This paper explores the question of how well regulation by the nonthreshold approach has achieved the goal of protecting public health, whether it does this better than the alternative use of the threshold approach, and whether the incremental protection it affords is a meaningful public benefit that justifies the aforementioned impacts on industry.
INTRODUCTION
The 1964 report of the World Health Organization (27) finding that extrinsic factors such as smoking, diet, and alcohol consumption were responsible for most cancers has been transformed over the decades, ultimately yielding today's public perception that environmental exposure to synthetic chemicals is a major contributor to the high cancer incidence among the population. Official pronouncements, such as those provided in 1970 by the ad hoc committee of the Surgeon General (15) , that &dquo;No safe level of exposure to a chemical carcinogen should be considered toxicologically insignificant for man&dquo; and political debates about what constitutes acceptable carcinogenic risk for pesticides have helped shaped this widespread belief. Recently, even 1 out of 5 members of the US Society of Toxicology agreed with the statement that &dquo;There is no safe level of exposure to a cancer-causing agent&dquo; (12) . This perception has led to public demands on regulatory agencies to answer questions about cancer risk, questions that science cannot answer; science cannot verify the negative proposition that an adverse effect will not occur. In response to public demands to be protected, regulatory agencies have employed sophisticated mathematical models to estimate carcinogenic responses at relevant environmental exposures that are well below the experimental range of long-term animal bioassays. These nonthreshold models yield numerical estimates of carcinogenic risk that are generally perceived to be accurate and protective of public health.
The goal of this paper is to address the impact on industry of regulating carcinogens using the nonthreshold approach, from the standpoint of the crop protection industry in the United States. This paper takes a critical look at how the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) uses the linearized multistage mathematical model for quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as a means of protecting public health and describes the impact that this nonthreshold approach has on industry with respect to commercial success, financial returns on investment, and the ability to sustain the continual discovery and development of safer products.
PESTICIDE INDUSTRY AND NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Modem chemical control of pests has contributed to a dramatic improvement in public welfare since its introduction 50 years ago. Millions of lives have been saved through the control of disease vectors, and millions more have been improved by the cost-effective use of chemicals that provide society with an inexpensive and abundant food supply. These benefits have arisen from the selective effects that these biologically active chemicals have on target organisms. Imperfections in this selectivity, however, have been the source of well-publicized untoward effects on non-target organisms, including humans, effects that have been exacerbated, in many instances, by misuse, misguided use, or overuse of pesticides. The challenge to industry, governments, and the public has been to determine how to derive the benefits of these socially useful chemicals in the face of their inherent risk. The answer has been strict government regulation.
The pesticide industry is one of the most highly regulated industry segments in the United States and among developed countries. Last year sales reached $30 billion worldwide, and research expenditures among the major companies ran about 10% of sales. A significant portion of this expenditure was dedicated to the continuing safety evaluations of existing commercial products and to discovering new, safer, and more efficacious products. The ideal pesticide today is defined as highly selective to its target, effective at low use rates, safe to users and nontarget organisms, residual just long enough to perform its function, and incapable of migrating to groundwater or surface waters. If the historical hit-rate for taking a molecule from the laboratory to market has been 1 in 20,000 chemicals screened, then the requirements for modem products have surely lowered the probability of success in the future.
On average, the development of a new compound takes about 10 years, costs upwards of $60 million, and, therefore, represents the assumption by an organization of significant financial, market, and product risk. Development products run the regulatory gauntlet of more than 120 tests, the results of which are used in risk assessments. These tests are intended to define the chemical's intrinsic toxicity, its disposition in the environment, and the effects of occupational exposures and potential exposures to the public from dietary and nondietary sources. Ultimately, these tests provide the foundation for informed judgments by industry and governments, judgments that ensure that the product performs its intended function and that users are aware of the conditions under which it can be used safely. Current toxicity testing usually involves a battery of acute and chronic tests with 2 or 3 animal species extended over a period of several years or generations. Contributing to the risk of investing millions of dollars in product development is the uncertainty related to the outcome of the long-term animal feeding tests: a 2-generation rodent reproduction study, chronic toxicity tests in rodent and nonrodent species, and oncogenicity tests in 2 rodent species. The results of these tests come late in the development cycle, after most of the investment has been made, and this contributes to the overall financial risk associated with product development.
Short-term genotoxicity tests (including tests for gene mutations in bacterial and mammalian cells, cytogenicity, and in vivo chromosome aberration) are usually conducted in the early phases of product development to enable companies to identify health risks as early as possible in the process and to provide clues to the outcome of the longer term animal bioassays. Given the uncertainties of product development, companies tend to target markets that offer the opportunity to recover development costs as quickly as possible and assure an adequate return on investment to fund continuing research into safer products. For this reason, most, if not all, pesticidal chemicals are developed for use in agriculture-primarily for use with major row crops such as cereals or highvalue specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables-before they are developed for residential and public health uses.
REGULATION OF CARCINOGENIC PESTICIDES IN THE UNITED STATES
Pesticides are regulated in the United States by the US EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-denticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. These 2 laws set forth the statutory criteria for granting product approvals and for establishing acceptable levels of pesticide chemical residues on treated crops in the food supply, called tolerances in the United States and called maximum residue limits elsewhere. In order to register a pesticide product, the US EPA must determine that its use is unlikely to cause unreasonable adverse effects to the environment, that there is a reasonable certainty that it will pose no harm to man, and that the benefits of use outweigh the risks. To arrive at this conclusion, the US EPA performs a comprehensive risk assessment for human health and environmental safety based upon data that it requires registrants to submit in support of their applications.
As a surrogate for the public good, the US EPA is responsible for arriving at judgments that are protective of public health and the environment while simultaneously providing agriculture with the beneficial technology needed to supply an abundant and healthful food supply. Because regulatory judgments are vulnerable to potential litigation, unfavorable public opinion, and congressional scrutiny, the US EPA has the unenviable task of trying to &dquo;please all of the people all of the time.&dquo; Its greatest challenge is to protect the integrity of the process and ensure that its judgments are science-based.
The US EPA regulates carcinogens by both threshold and nonthreshold approaches and bases its choice on the weight of evidence presented in the toxicological portion of the registration petition. Weight-of-evidence determinations are based on whether one or both rodent sexes are affected, on the dose response of tumor induction, on the malignancy of the tumor, on tumor type, on number of tumor sites, on time to tumor occurrence, and on ancillary weight factors, such as structure-activity relationship, repeat experiments in a second and unrelated strain, whether the same tumor type occurred in both sexes, and evidence of carcinogenicity in a second rodent species (7) . The US EPA does not consider genotoxicity as a primary weight factor in its evaluations but rather looks upon it as additional evidence to support observations in long-term feeding studies.
Based on weight of evidence, pesticides are assigned to 1 of 5 alphanumeric groups (Table 1 ) and are ranked from highest (Group A) to lowest concern (Group E). Groups A, B, and Cq* carcinogens are regulated by the nonthreshold approach. Group C, with the weakest evidence of carcinogenicity, is regulated using the threshold approach.
Under the threshold approach, the US EPA applies an uncertainty factor of 100 or greater to the lowest relevant no-effect level to calculate an acceptable exposure for chronic risk. This value is known by many as the acceptable daily intake but currently goes by the term reference dose (RfD). The uncertainty factor of 100 represents a 10-fold factor for interspecies differences and a 10-fold factor for the range of human susceptibility. Additional uncertainty factors may also be applied to account for the quality of the data, differences in susceptibility between adults and children and infants, and the severity of the effect. In contrast, the nonthreshold ap- proach triggers a QRA wherein acceptable exposures are established based upon a calculated carcinogenic potency (ql*) and an assumption of a linear dose response at very low doses. The statutory standard for acceptable risk under this approach is a one in a million lifetime risk of cancer.
Pathologists play a critical role in the regulatory outcome for a chemical in weight-of-evidence determinations because of the strong consideration given to malignant tumors and the distinctions between benign and malignant tumors. The value of continually upgrading diagnostic criteria and applying the most contemporary pathologic standards to cancer hazard assessments cannot be understated. Two examples serve to illustrate this point.
The first case involves the miticide dicofol ( Table 2 ).
In 1985, the National Toxicology Program (NTP), at the US EPA's request, reread the histopathological slides from a cancer study in mice that had been reported by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) 7 years earlier (21) .
There are 2 striking features in the comparison of the pathology readings: many of the tumors originally thought to be malignant were benign, and the total number of tumors was different. More tumors were found in the low-dose group and fewer in the high-dose group. This change in diagnosis resulted in a downgrading of the carcinogenic potential of dicofol from Group Cq* to Group C, in a change in its regulation from QRA to RfD, and in an increase in the number of acceptable crop uses for dicofol.
In a second case, an unusual tumor type was reported in the urinary bladder of male mice in a lifetime feeding study of the insecticide-miticide bifenthrin. The tumor, judged to be malignant in the original report, was several years later determined by a pathology working group to be neither malignant nor statistically significantly increased. When presented with this new evidence, the US EPA downgraded the classification of bifenthrin from Group Cq* to Group C, and it began regulating its use using the threshold approach rather than QRA, which cre- (21) ].
Abbreviations: NCI = National Cancer Institute; NTP = National Toxicology Program. ated more crop opportunities. More than a decade after the original reading, a working group of the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), Risk Science Institute found that since the 1950s, this lesion had been variously described in 17 studies as leiomyosarcoma, leiomyoblastoma, atypical hemangiopericytoma, and submucosal granuloma. The ILSI proposed the term submucosal mesenchymal tumor, but more important from the standpoint of human risk assessment was their conclusion that this tumor had never been reported in humans or, for that matter, in any other animal (9) . These examples highlight how pathologic opinion can translate into conservative risk assessments and overregulation of pesticides, which eventually have financial consequences for companies. In view of the pivotal role of pathology in risk assessment, it is important for government reviewers and industry scientists to recognize that &dquo;getting it right&dquo; requires a continual questioning of older studies.
CONSERVATISM OF US EPA REGULATION
Much has been said about the US EPA's conservative approach to risk assessment and risk management. There can be little disagreement that when one compounds numerous worst-case assumptions for hazard identification, dose response, and exposure, one runs the risk of developing risk estimates that bear little relationship to actual human risk. If one then further complicates risk estimates with risk management decisions driven by political, social, and economic imperatives, the result is guaranteed to stimulate public debate.
The US EPA practice of requiring animal testing at the maximum tolerated dose and its operating philosophy that &dquo;any evidence of tumorigenic activity in animals is a signal that the agent is a potential human carcinogen&dquo; (1) increases the probability of false positives and reflects a lack of concern about the possibility that test protocols may produce false negatives. Although this might not be the best science, it is not entirely without merit when judging matters of public health on the basis of fairly blunt toxicological tools. It has been pointed out that at a 99% confidence limit, a test with 1,000 animals might indicate no tumors even though they might occur at a frequency of 0.46% in the population (24) . This means that for the US population of 260 million, the number of individuals at risk may be as high as 1.2 million people (of course, it might be 0 people also). To increase the certainty of this number by increasing the number of test animals is simply too impractical, as one would need to find no tumors in 460 million in order to reduce this risk to less than 1 in 100 million (11) .
An alternative approach to improving the chances of identifying potential carcinogens is to require animal bioassays that include a maximum tolerated dose (MTD).
Unfortunately, this raises new questions about whether one is compensating for the relative insensitivity of the animal bioassay or just increasing the incidence of false negatives. On the one hand, it is argued that testing at the MTD overwhelms cellular protective mechanisms, that it can promote either direct or indirect tumor promotion through cytotoxicity or alterations in hormonal or immune responses (11) , or that it may produce nonspecific tissue damage that stimulates mitogenesis, which in turn promotes carcinogenesis through increased mutagenesis (2) . On the other hand, others argue that reducing the high dose to one-half the MTD would lower the sensitivity of the study for detecting carcinogenic effects. Analysis of the NTP database showed that two-thirds of the carcinogens would have been missed at one-half the MTD (10) , an observation used to support both sides of the argument.
The MTD employed in animal bioassays for pesticides may be higher than one would normally expect. The most frequently cited definition of MTD is from NCI guidelines : &dquo;The MTD is defined as the highest dose of the test agent during the chronic study that can be predicted not to alter the animal's normal longevity from effects other than carcinogenicity&dquo; (20) . Prior to 1988, the US EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs accepted minimal signs of toxicity as evidence of an MTD, but in 1988, registrants were advised to begin judging MTDs on the basis of significant toxicity. According to the US EPA's position document, &dquo;The level should not be selected too far below a life threatening level because the highest dose tested in the oncogenicity study should elicit significant toxicity without substantially altering the normal lifespan of the test species from effects other than tumor formation&dquo; (8) . The net effect has been to raise the high dose above levels that would have been historically acceptable under the more broadly held definition. This makes it all the more surprising that the incidence of potentially carcinogenic chemicals among pesticides is lower than that of chemicals on average.
INCIDENCE OF GENOTOXIC CARCINOGENS AMONG PESTICIDES
About 15% of the approximately 600 active ingredients registered as pesticides in the United States have shown evidence of carcinogenic potential (23) . This compares with a 50% incidence of carcinogens among the synthetic and natural chemicals that have been tested in long-term rodent feeding studies (2) . Forty of these pesticides are classified as possible human carcinogens (category C) and are regulated by the threshold approach, as are noncarcinogens. Twenty-four are classified as possible human carcinogens with QRA (Cq*), and 25 are classified as probable human carcinogens (B2) and are regulated by QRA. A list of B~ and Cq* carcinogens appears in Tables 3 and 4 (23).
The reasons for this lower incidence are not clear, but several explanations come to mind. It may be that because pesticide candidates are tested for genotoxicity in the early stages of development, those with strong positives are considered likely carcinogens with poor probability of regulatory success and, therefore, are dropped from development. Another plausible explanation relates to observations that high acute toxicity reduces the risk of tumor formation because MTDs are lower. One notes that insecticides are underrepresented in the list of probable and possible carcinogens, particularly if one discounts the older, highly lipophilic chlorinated hydrocarbons. Of the 40 organophosphates for which the US EPA has established food tolerances, only one, dichlorvos, can be found among the weaker group of Cq* carcinogens. On the other hand, herbicides and fungicides with lower acute toxicity dominate the list of B2 carcinogens. Whatever the reason might be, the fact remains that pesticides are less likely to be carcinogenic than are natural and synthetic chemicals, in general.
Of the 50 pesticides identified by the US EPA as probable or possible human carcinogens, only 14 show any evidence of genotoxicity based on a review of US EPA records. This is consistent with the observations of Ames and Gold that the majority of carcinogens identified in rodent tests are not mutagenic (2) . There does not appear to be any relationship between evidence of genotoxicity and carcinogen group among these compounds. Genotoxic carcinogens are evenly split between groups B2 and Cq* and are found among the most and least potent compounds in each group. Also, the majority of carcinogenic pesticides are regulated by the nonthreshold approach, even though they are not genotoxic. Apparently, once the weight of evidence for a pesticide crosses a certain threshold of information, it is inferred to have a linear dose response down to zero exposure, even though the nonthreshold model has only been rationalized for initiator (genotoxic, DNA-reactive) carcinogens (11) .
QRA OF PESTICIDES
The necessity for QRA may have arisen out of the controversy in the early 1970s surrounding an attempt by US EPA lawyers to obtain judicial recognition of a set of principles on cancer as &dquo;officially noted facts,&dquo; al-though these principles were nothing more than a combination of prevailing knowledge, supposition, and regulatory policy (11) . Ever since, the US EPA has been the major producer and most enthusiastic practitioner of QRA. , The concept of a linear nonthreshold theory of carcinogenesis probably owes its scientific origins to early radiation research and the 1928 recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (26) . Its legislative origins spring from the Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of the 1950s, which prohibited the use of a carcinogenic chemical as a food additive. Although the standard of zero exposure for carcinogenic additives may have been reasonable at a time of relatively insensitive analytical methodology, it became more problematic as advances in analytical methodology made it possible to detect an ever lower &dquo;zero,&dquo; from the parts-per-million to the parts-perbillion and parts-per-trillion ranges. This drove the need for a de minimus policy for carcinogenic risk, wherein acceptable exposures were equated with a carcinogenic risk deemed so miniscule as to be of little or no practical concern. This alternative approach to absolute safety was achievable through quantitative mathematical modeling, and the acceptable regulatory standard became one in a million lifetime risk of cancer. This brightline regulatory health standard is now entrenched in US law and in the US regulatory system, as reflected by The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, the Clean Air Act Re-Authorization, and California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. Many mathematical models are available to carry out low-dose estimates of carcinogenic risk, but the US EPA chose the linear multistage model (LMS) because it made fuller use of the bioassay data (11) and because it appeared to be biologically feasible (14) . Estimates of carcinogenic risk rely on the statistical parameter q, * (car-cinogen potency factor), which represents the 95% upper confidence limit of the maximum likelihood estimate (q1) derived from a best-fit curve for the animal bioassay data. In practical terms, ql* is the slope of the straight line representing the relationship between exposure and lifetime cancer risk in the low-dose region below the experimental range of the study. Using it, one can calculate the risk associated with a given exposure or, conversely, the exposure associated with a specific risk. It has been pointed out, however, that LMS produces estimates of risk that are very similar to those of the one-hit model (13, 14) .
SHORTCOMINGS OF QRA
The shortcomings of QRA start with the weight-ofevidence determination. Weight-of-evidence determinations take into account the entire toxicological database in reaching a judgment about the nature and degree of concern for a pesticide's carcinogenic potential. However, once a pesticide qualifies for QRA, estimates of carcinogenic risk are estimated on the basis of a single experiment. Carcinogen potency (qI*) calculated from a single experiment is greatly influenced by the MTD, and similar risk estimates may be obtained for carcinogens with a clear dose response and for those with marginally significant carcinogen potential (14) . Quantitative risk assessments are sensitive to certain underlying assumptions that can lead to overstatements of risk. Wilson (25) estimated that conservative assumptions for the surface area &dquo;scaling factor&dquo; and for the most sensitive species overestimate actual risks by at least a 30-fold measure. Others have pointed out that risk might be exaggerated anywhere from 16-fold to 35,000-fold (13) . From a commercial viewpoint, the most interesting assumption is for exposure to a chemical for a lifetime of 70 years. Although there are a few products that have been in use for 40 years, no company would assume a commercial life of 70 years for a new active ingredient, yet this is what the US EPA does in its risk assessments. A major pitfall in communicating a cancer risk estimate of one in a million is the tendency to multiply it by the size of the population at risk. One in a million does not equate to 260 deaths per year in the US population. Instead, it equates to approximately 4 incidents of cancer per year, and this is against a background of one million cancer deaths annually (6) . Often forgotten in communicating risk estimates is any statement that values derived from QRA represent upper-bound estimates and, more importantly, that the actual risk might be zero. So malleable are the underlying assumptions that one US EPA administrator was noted to say that risk assessment was like a political prisoner: if you torture it long enough it will give you any answer you want (11) .
To get a sense of the nature of the distortions associated with QRA, the author calculated reference-specific doses (RSDs) representing an acceptable exposure equivalent to a one in a million lifetime cancer risk for all carcinogenic pesticides (Tables 3 and 4 ). The results make one question the value of QRA as a suitable approach for protecting public health. Quantitative risk assessment fails to rank carcinogens consistent with the US EPA's alphanumeric classification system. The alphanumeric classification of carcinogens purportedly ranks carcinogens in order of decreasing concern for their ability to pose a threat to humans. Thus, a B2 carcinogen is of greater concern than a Cq* carcinogen and is more likely to be a human carcinogen. Surprisingly, though, QRA leads to many cases in which greater exposures to B2 carcinogens are allowed. The tables make it quite clear that 15 of the presumably more potent B2 carcinogens have higher acceptable exposures than do the top 10 Cq* carcinogens. In fact, the least potent B2 carcinogen (captan) has an acceptable exposure that is 830 times higher than that of the most potent Cq* carcinogen (cyanazine). This outcome is neither consistent with sound scientific judgment nor with sound risk management. The point is not that B2 carcinogens are not adequately regulated but that Cq* carcinogens are overregulated and that an uncritical reliance on risk numbers is no substitute for scientific judgment and common sense.
US EPA'S NEW RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES
In 1996, the US EPA proposed a revised set of guidelines for cancer risk assessment (22) . The new guidelines, when adopted, will replace the alphanumeric classification scheme (of Groups A through E) with the descriptors &dquo;known/likely,&dquo; &dquo;cannot be determined,&dquo; and &dquo;not likely.&dquo; Descriptors for each chemical will be accompanied by a narrative that will explain the strength of the data, a greater discussion of the extent and weight of evidence, and a clear elaboration of default assumptions and their rationale. Noting that the linearized multistage model &dquo;gave an appearance of specific knowledge and sophistication unwarranted for a default,&dquo; the US EPA proposed regulating on the basis of an LEDjO, the 95% lower confidence limit on the benchmark dose corresponding to a 10% increase in extra risk. Until this new scheme is adopted and pesticides reevaluated, the conclusions and regulatory consequences of the preceding QRA framework will continue to apply.
While relying on an expanded narrative to describe carcinogenic potential is preferable to the alphanumeric system, the use of LEDIO to quantify acceptable exposures will not necessarily solve the shortcomings noted for QRA. To illustrate this point, the author commissioned a comparative risk analysis of a set of simulated data (Table 5) for 2 chemicals with different weights of evidence for carcinogenicity. Compound A has a clear dose response, was tumorigenic in 2 rodent species and both sexes, and was genotoxic. Compound B, on the oth- er hand, showed evidence of carcinogenicity at the MTD only.
One sees in Table 6 that despite the very dramatic differences in carcinogenic potential between the 2 compounds, there is less than a magnitude of difference in their LED ios. Surprisingly, there is less of a difference in the LED 10 than in the cancer potencies (ql*) calculated under QRA, all of which reinforce the point that the MTD or highest dose tested in a carcinogenicity study is still a significant determinant of the risk estimate and that inaccurate regulatory decisions will continue to be made on the basis of very high dose experimentation.
REGULATION OF CARCINOGENS USING UNCERTAINTY FACTORS
Unlike the United States, other governments very seldom use QRA. In the United Kingdom, government departments have been advised against the routine use of QRA for chemical carcinogens (5) . Government agencies around the world by and large regulate noncarcinogenic and carcinogenic pesticides using a threshold approach based on the application of a safety factor or uncertainty factor, with the goal of arriving at an acceptable daily intake. This approach was conceived in 1961 by the Joint Food and Agriculture OrganizationlWorld Health Organization Expert Committee on Food Additives, which since 1978 has applied uncertainty factors of between 10and 5,000-fold, with the majority of decisions based on application of a 100-fold uncertainty factor (13) . In general and with respect to pesticides, regulators outside the United States apply uncertainty factors that range from 100 to 3,000. This is consistent with US EPA practice for threshold carcinogens and systemic toxicants. To appreciate the difference in results between the nonthreshold approach in the United States and the threshold approach practiced elsewhere, the author translated the RSDs of Tables 3 and 4 into uncertainty factors using corresponding no-effect levels reported by the US EPA. As the tables show, safety factors in the United States for these carcinogens in range from 1,500 to 1.8 million.
That regulation of carcinogens to a lifetime risk standard of one in a million excess tumors equates to safety factors of up to 1.8 million is evidence of the effects of compounding worst-case assumptions in QRA. In theory, a safety factor of 1.8 million is more protective of public health than, say, a safety factor of 10,000, but practically speaking, one cannot prove that one factor is measurably more protective than the other. So while the US EPA's regulation of these carcinogens is dramatically more conservative than that of the rest of the world, it does not necessarily mean that the US EPA does a better job of protecting public health. 
IMPACT ON INDUSTRY
An earlier section of this paper noted the low probability of discovering a pesticidal chemical, the time it takes to realize a benefit from that discovery, and the financial commitment required to bring that molecule from the laboratory to the market. Research-based companies reach development decisions in anticipation of realizing a reasonable return on investment after a careful analysis of product, market, and regulatory risks. Given the required large investment, pesticides are developed primarily on the strength of their utility to agriculture, in which case market opportunity is, for the most part, defined by the number of crops on which the product can be used. By using simulated data in a financial model to define the relationship between the limits imposed by the nonthreshold approach on crop uses and the return on investment, this section describes the impact on industry of the nonthreshold approach.
In this illustration, a company decided to develop a new pesticidally active ingredient with the expectation of selling it for use on 5 crops, with total sales of $200 million at maturity. The company submitted studies in support of its registration application; these studies showed the compound to be a nongenotoxic carcinogen. Upon review, the US EPA decided to classify the compound as a Cq* carcinogen with QRA, and as a consequence of this action, product use was limited to only 2 of the original 5 intended crops; this reduction potential use constituted a return of one-half of the original $200 million maturity sales forecast. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between threshold (RfD) and nonthreshold (QRA) approaches in terms of a net present value. Net present value is the financial term used to describe the value of future cash flow in today's dollars, and it takes into account inflation and a risk premium. The simplified example, for those interested, assumed an investment of $60 million in development, a capital investment of $50 million in a manufacturing facility, and no provision for taxes.
Under the threshold approach, in which the compound would be regulated by RfD, the company could have expected to break even on its investment about 13 years after discovering the compound, and the project would return a net present value of about $340 million. The nonthreshold approach, on the other hand, extended the break-even period by 18 months and reduced the net present value by almost $200 million. Given that QRA may not under all circumstances enhance public health by any meaningful measure, it is not clear that the $200 million penalty to the company is reasonable or justified.
These differences in value are not inconsequential. As regulatory hurdles for safer products become higher, the probabilities of discovering development candidates fall, and the cost of finding strategies to offset these lower probabilities rises. As opportunities for existing commercial products shrink in an increasingly crowded market, product sales begin to follow the downward slope of the life cyle curve. The ability to bring new products to market is critical to offsetting this inevitable decline, and so the industry must fund discovery research in order to maintain a viable business for the long term. It is not logical for regulators to demand ever-safer products while simultaneously undermining the funding mechanism for achieving that objective.
HARMONIZING ON THE THRESHOLD APPROACH
In view of the shortcomings of the nonthreshold approach and the distortions it introduces that work against public health protection, it is reasonable to propose that the US EPA bring its risk assessment practices into line with world practice by adopting a threshold approach for all chemicals, regardless of their potential carcinogenicity. This is not a novel suggestion. Others have already suggested this (13, 26) : most recently, such a suggestion was made by one of the originators of the linearized multistage model (4) . And at the March 1998 annual meeting of the Society of Toxicology, a poll of attendees showed overwhelming support for carcinogen risk assessment using the threshold approach (19) . Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. The brightline regulatory health standard of one in a million is so widely accepted in the United States and is so embedded into law that the costs in political capital and public perception could never justify a sudden, dramatic shift in policy. However, the US EPA should consider taking a step in the direction of harmonizing with world practice by reserving nonthreshold risk estimates for B2 carcinogens only and not for Cq* carcinogens. Regulating the latter by the threshold approach is within the US EPA's purview and has a number of attractive advantages that would benefit the public and industry without sacrificing public health (13) .
Regulation by RfD is inherently a more transparent approach. It is simpler to implement and is more easily understood by the public than are those quantitative methods used to predict low-level risk. The magnitude of the uncertainty factors applied to a no-effecf level better reflects weight-of-evidence conclusions about the strength of the data, the completeness of the data set, the severity of the endpoint, mechanistic information, and the relevance to humans. Regulation by RfD makes it easy to revise the risk assessment as new evidence is generated, and it is a more straightforward method of assuring that carcinogens are ranked appropriately.
Abandoning the notion that we can predict low-level risks and harmonizing on the threshold approach would move the public away from the extreme view that there are no safe levels of carcinogens and would focus attention on the main preventable causes of cancer: tobacco, diet, and exposure to sunlight. As was pointed out as early as 1973 by the National Research Council Committee on Food Protection, &dquo;The great concern of the public in demanding an absolutely safe food supply, free of harmful 'chemicals,' is mistaken and misdirected....
In the United States today the chief food hazards probably result from overeating, particularly of foods rich in fats and sugar&dquo; (16) . The report went on to emphasize &dquo;the value of a varied diet to ensure that the intake of specific chemical substances (natural or synthetic) in foods will be inadequate to cause this injury.&dquo; This view was reiterated in the 1996 National Research Council report (18) on carcinogens and anticarcinogens in the human diet. In the press release accompanying the report, the committee chair, Dr Ronald Estabrook, stated, &dquo;While some chemicals in the diet do have the ability to cause cancer, they appear to be a threat only when they are present in foods that form an unusually large part of the diet. The varied and balanced diet needed for good nutrition-including fruits and vegetables-seems to provide significant protection from the natural toxicants in our foods.&dquo;
Quantifying cancer risk may be attractive to the regulatory process, but as has been illustrated, it is a practice that at times is at odds with its own goals of protecting public health. It can lead to unnecessary restrictions on products that would enhance the abundance and availability of fruits and vegetables. And the hidden costs such quantification imposes can indirectly affect the public welfare. By one estimate, every $5 to $12 million increase in regulatory costs may cause one additional death (3) .
Increased levels of acceptable exposure that would be considered safe under a threshold approach may create new market uses for existing products. This would give farmers more choices for crop protection, spur additional competition, and serve as a boon to research funding. Increasing the number of different products that are available would have the counterintuitive effect of reducing risk by reducing exposure to any particular chemical in the diet, as the National Academy of Sciences noted.
In order to move in the right direction, pesticide regulation in the United States will require compromise in the spirit of broad socioeconomic interest. It will require a wise and impartial US EPA, which will need to balance the need for appropriate levels of public health protection and the incentives for industry to conduct the research and development of safer products for the future.
